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The Admissibility of Social Science Evidence
in Person-Oriented Legal Adjudication
IRA P. ROBBINS*
INTRODUCTION
The law is an illimitably visaged phenomenon; it pervades the
human experience. Whatever one's definition of l.w-be it "the word
of him, that by right hath command over others,' "nothing else than
an ordinance of reason for the common good, made and promulgated
by him who has care of the community . ,,2 "the enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules,"' or "[t]he
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious . . . ."-it undeniably bears upon the human species in its
every operation.' One would therefore expect that any inquiry which
might increase our understanding of the human condition would also be
useful to the law. Yet this expectation has not been fulfilled; investiga-
tions in the law often have rejected meritorious evidence procurable
from another expanse of cognition-that of social science.'
*A.B. 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973, Harvard University; Associate
Professor of Law, designate, University of Kansas; member, New York Bar.
IT. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN; OR THE MATTER, FORmE, & PowER OF A COMMONWEALTH,
ECcLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL 109 (A. Waller ed. 1935).
2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part II, First Part, Question 90 (D. Sul-
livan ed. 1952).
3 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 122 (rev. paperback ed. 1969).
'Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 451 (1897). In this con-
nection, Chief Justice Hughes once observed: "the Constitution is what the judges say
it is . .. ." Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, Elmira, N.Y., May 3, 1907,
in C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 1906-1916, at 179, 185 (2d ed.
1961); accord, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) Marshall, C.J.)
("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depa-.rtment to say what the
law is."); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH 12 (1951 ed.) ("What these officials
[judges, sheriffs, clerks, jailers, lawyers] do about disputes is, to my mind, the law it-
self."). The list of definitions in the text is by no means intendcd to be all-inclusive.
5 The foregoing statements do not necessarily presuppose a philosophy of universal
law, although universal law is one of the jurisprudential foundations of this article.
They merely betoken the point that actions, activities, and exp eriences cannot be seen
wholly apart from the law.
6 "Social science" has been defined as "the study of people living together in
groups, as families, tribes, communities, etc" and "any of sexeral studies, as history,
economics, civics, etc., dealing with the structure of society and the activity of its
members." WEBSTER'S NEW WoRLD DicTIONARY 1351 (2d College ed. 1970). Rose adds
that the term comprises "those theoretical disciplines which s;eek to understand and
predict human behavior in terms of general principles empirically tested." Rose, The
Social Scientist as an Expert Witness, 40 MINN. L. REv. 205, 206 (1956). The term
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This is not to say that the law has not trifled with social science in
the past, often to the benefit of both.' And certainly it cannot lie
doubted that scientific ideas and technological development have had
immeasurable effects upon conceptions of law. For instance, Patterson
has noted that the invention of the automobile, followed by urban traffic
"sociology" can be distinguished as "the science of human society and of social relations,
organization, and change; specif. the study of beliefs, values, interrelationships, etc. of
societal groups and of the principles or processes governing social phenomena." WEBs Ea's
NEw WoRLD DIcTIoNARY, supra; at 1352. Thus, "social science" is the more general
term, and the term embraced by this article. But the relationship occasionally has been
muted in semantics:
The situation in the social sciences is this: on the one hand a motley col-
lection of sciences or quasi sciences which though they have the same objects
are not aware of their kinship or of the unity of facts with which they are con-
cerned; on the other a sociology, aware of this unity, but hovering over them
from on high and incapable of influencing their procedure.
Durkheim, La Sociologie en France An xixe Siacle, 13 REVUE POLITIQUE ET LrrrTLM3EA
609, 647 (1900), translated and quoted in Ginsberg, Introduction to L. HOBHOUSE, SoCi-
OLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, at xiii (1966) ; see also Hobhouse, Editorial, 1 Soc. REV. 1, 8
(1908) :
Properly considered General Sociology is neither a separate science complete in
itself before specialism begins, nor is it a mere synthesis of the social sciences
consisting in a mechanical juxtaposition of their results. It is rather a
vitalising principle that runs through all social investigation nourishing and
nourished by it in turn, stimulating inquiry, correlating results, exhibiting the
life of the whole in the parts and returning from the study of the parts to a
fuller comprehension of the whole.
7For example, there today exists the Law and Society Association, which publishes a
journal entitled the Law and Society Review. Other journals relating law with society and
the social sciences are the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, Law and
Contemporary Problems, Law and the Social Order, Wisconsin Law Review (which,
since 1970, regularly has devoted a section to "Law and Society"), and Yale Review
of Law and Social Action. Such journals are not unique to this country. Foreign
journals include Revista de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales (2 vols. 1923-1924) and Revista
Juridica de Ciencias Sociales (54 vols. 1884-1937) (Argentina) ; Annales da Droit et des
Sciences Sociales (3 vols. 1933-1936) and Archives de Philosophie dic Droit et de
Sociologie Juridique (9 vols. 1931-1939) (France); Revista de Derecho y Ciencias
Sociales (13 vols. 1927-1941) (Paraguay); Revista de Ciencias Juridicas y
Sociales (19 vols. 1918-1936) (Spain); Revista de Derecho y Ciencias
Sociales (9 vols." 1914-1921, continued as Revista de Derecho Jurisprudencia y Admin-
istracidn) (Uruguay). In addition, the directory of the American Association of Law
Schools now records more than 170 law school teachers offering courses in "Law and
Society." See generally Carlin, Howard & Messenger, Civil Justice and the Poor, 1
LAw & Soc'Y REV., June 1967, at 9-12. See also REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUN-
DATION, KNOWLEDGE INTO ACTION: IMPROVING THE NATION'S USE OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 33-34 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD]. These
two factors alone do not establish an unequivocal connection between law and social
science. But they do indicate that there is a common ground-that of affiliations, legal
or otherwise-from which each commences inquiry. This common ground was recognized
by Justice Holmes in 1897: "For the rational study of the law," he wrote, "the black-
letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics." Holmes, supra note 4, at 469; see also Hazard, Law School "Law" and
Sociolegal Research, 50 DENVER L.J. 403 (1974).
SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
congestion, the highway toll of death, injury, and d.mage, and the flight
to the suburbs gave rise to the need for new laws; that improved medical
knowledge has been used in the formulation of new legal norms;' and
that the development of the computer has had far-reaching implications
for many aspects of business, and for legal research. When acknowl-
edged and acted upon, social scientific studies can have legal effects
just as scientific advances do. Such studies typically can be classified
as follows, according to the subject matter with which they deal: legal
institutions; legal processes; legislation and public policy-making; and
impact or evaluation.1" Yet in light of the information that has been
derived from such investigations, one cannot but wonder why the
fruits of social science studies have not been put to fuller use in the law.
This article presents the case for the admission of social science
evidence in legal adjudication.1 Particular types of social science evi-
dence are not only relevant to particular types of legal judgments, but
they may be the best or the only evidence that exists or, at the least,
evidence pertinent to judgments which require all the relevant evidence
that can be provided. Applying the traditional justifications for exclud-
ing such evidence might result in unwarranted injustice nurtured by the
rules of our legal system.
THE LEGISLATIvE-ADJUDICATIVE DISTINCTION
There has been an intense endeavor both in social science and the
law to illuminate social and legal issues, and to view the individual in
8E. PATrERsoN, LAW IN A ScENTIFc AGE 3 (1963); see B. CAnozo, THE
PAnADoxEs Or LEGAL SCIENCE 1, 2 (1928). See generally Store, Knowledge, Survival
and the Duties of Science, 23 Am. U.L. REv. 231 (1973).
0 E. PATTERSON, supra note 8, at 12 n.21; see Dickerson, The Electronic Searching of
Law, 47 A.B.A.J. 902 (1961); Freed, Prepare Now for Mactine-Assisted Legal Re-
search, 47 A.B.A.J. 764 (1961).
10 Cairns discusses four "points of contact" between the social sciences and law:
analyses of the nature of law undertaken by sociologists; the "sociological method" as a
tool in lawmaking and legal analysis; sociological analyses of sociolegal institutions;
and the theory of cultural change as an aid to the changed material culture. H. CAMs,
LAw AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 124-68, 262 (1935). Hart and McNaughton view the
contacts differently: the after-the-event determination of adjudicative facts; the applica-
tion of uncertain or disputed law to disputed facts; and the framing of a legislative en-
actment. Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, 87 D.mALTLs, Fall
1958, at 41, 43, 52, 58; see also note 11 infra. Of course, there ne,:essarily is some degree
of overlap within each of these sets of categories.
". The first issue of the Law and Society Review listed five topics upon which the
future issues would concentrate: social science evidence in legal adjudication; issues of
legal policy in social science perspective; methodological problerms and techniques; re-
search opportunities and reports; and programs of sociolegal training. Schwartz, From
the Editor. . . , 1 LAW & Soc' REv., Nov. 1966, at 6, 7. Even this journal has notori-
ously neglected the first of these topics.
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relation to the sociolegal system. Most past and current social scientific
studies, for example, have concerned themselves with the observation
and analysis of existing and previously existing sociolegal microcosms.
And studies now are developing concerning the prediction of future
social structure, and with it new forms of conflict resolution and new
institutions of order. 2 Thus it can be stated that there are many descrip-
tive and predictive studies of legal systems. But equally important for
purposes of the beneficial coexistence of the two areas of inquiry is the
predictive aspect of social science research as it relates directly to the
individual, the basic component of any legal order. Such research,
when it has made its way into the judicial setting, usually has done so
under the guise of "legislative facts"-facts which inform the tribunal's
judgment in developing law or policy-rather than "adjudicative facts"
-which simply are the facts in a particular case as applied to the parties
involved."
Consider the cases of Beauharnais v. Illinois4 and Brown v. Board
of Education.5 In Beauharnais, the petitioner was convicted for dis-
tributing on the streets of Chicago leaflets attacking the moral char-
acter of black people, in violation of a statute which outlawed exhibiting
in a public place any publication which "portrays depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion [which] exposes [such citizens] to contempt, derision
or obloquy .... "16 Writing for the Supreme Court in upholding the
statute, Justice Frankfurter stated:
It is not within our competence to confirm or deny claims of social
scientists as to the dependence of the individual on the position of his
12 Cf. Yegge, President's Message, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 484, 485 (1969).
13 [A]djudicative facts are those . . . that normally go to the jury ....
They relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses.
Legislative facts . . . help the tribunal determine the content of law and of
policy and help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining
what course of action to take ...
• . . [F]indings or assumptions of legislative facts need not be, frequently
are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by evidence.
2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03, at 353 (1958). See also Davis, .Tudi-
cial Notice, 55 CoLum. L. Rv. 945, 952-59 (1955); Davis, An Approach to Problems
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAlv. L. REv. 364, 402-03 (1942). In
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953), the Supreme Court articu-
lated the distinction between adjudicative and legislative or "non-evidence" facts when it
said: "[I]n devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a particular
proceeding." It should be noted, however, the distinction is by no means without ambi-
guity. See Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
1343 U.S. 250 (1952).
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 IL.. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, § 471 (1949y, quoted in 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
[Vol. 50.493
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racial or religious group in the community.1 7
Yet only one and one-half years later, the Court in Brown-deciding
that state supported segregation of white and black children in tangibly
equivalent public schools, solely on the basis of race, denied to black
children the equal protection of the laws-unanimously cited in support
of its decision just such social scientific studies."
Whatever the justification for this sudden turn, 9 it is safe to say
that evidence derived from the social sciences is here to stay, at least for
certain purposes. This observation is especially valid for cases involv-
ing various forms of economic activity," wherein the Supreme Court
had acknowledged the judicial utility of extralegal empirical studies long
before Brown.2 Such cases include litigation in antitrust,22 breach of
contract,2 3 false advertising or misbranding, 4 trademark and unfair
17 343 U.S. at 263.
28 See 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11.
10 1 do not mean to say that Beauharnais and Brown are not distinguishable, nor that
the social science studies in each are the same or even similar. I merely note the apparent
change in attitude of the Court as to the reception of social science evidence in non-
economic cases, when only one seat changed hands in the interim. (Earl Warren replaced
Fred M. Vinson in 1953.) This article is not directed at dissecting this transition. For
such material see P. ROSEN, THE SUPREM4E COURT AM SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972) ; Cahn,
Jurisprudence, Annual Survey of American Law, 30 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 150 (1955).
For other social scicnce material concerning the desegregaLtion debate, see Clark,
The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness in Civil Rights Lfligation, 1 Soc. PROB. 5
(1953); Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5
%TILL. L. REv. 224 (1960) ; Gregor, The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An
Assessment, 14 WEST. RES. L. REV. 621 (1963); Lewis, Parry and Riposte to Gregor's
"The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation," 14 WEsT. REs. L. Rv. 637 (1963);
Rose, supra note 2, at 212-14; van den Haag, Social Science Tortimony in the Desegre-
gation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. IEv. 69 (1960).
20 See Zeisel, The Law, in THE USES OF SOCIOLOGx 81 (P. Lazarsfeld, W. Sewell,
& H. Wilensky eds. 1967).
21 Such usefulness was first recognized in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Note the following remark made in 1968:
Today one might suppose that the social sciences were plainly welcome in
the house of the law. Certainly law's receptivity to econc mic theory has in-
creased . . . . However, as we enter areas that are more sensitive, evidence of
progress is less clear. Noting the to-do touched off by Chief Justice Warren's
citation of social and behavioral studies in the famous footnote I1 in Brown v.
Board of Education, one would scarcely have supposed that by then almost fifty
years had elapsed since the filing of the first Brandeis brief.
Cavers, First Academic Symposium: Law and the Social Scienccs, in THE PATH OF THE
LAW FRoBI 1967, at 44, 45 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968).
.12 E.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill.
1959) (impact on market value of stock) ; United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 118 F. Supp. 42 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (economic realities of
market situation).
3 E.g., R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 128 Cal. App. 2d 172, 274 P.2d 928
(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 928 (1955) (public conventions aid morals); Stanley v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1930) (similarity between
two radio programs).2 4 E.g., Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953), rev'd in part,
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competition,25 and infringement and unfair competition 26 -cases in which
the social scientific methodology of public opinion or poll research has
sometimes been employed . 7 This is not to say that all methods of
348 U.s. 940 (1955) (misleading drug advertising) ; Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d
58 (4th Cir. 1950) (misleading toothpaste advertising).
25 E.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959)
(secondary meaning of "Bavarian" beer) ; Standard Oil Co. [Indiana] v. Standard Oil
Co. [Ohio], 141 F. Supp. 876 (D. Wyo. 1956), aff'd, 252 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1958).26E.g., Hawley Products Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir.
1958) (secondary meaning of hand luggage design); see generally Note, Consuner Polls
as Evidence in Unfair Trade Cases, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 211 (1951).
There also is a miscellaneous group of cases, which includes validity of traffic regu-
lations, e.g., Eighth Ave. Coach Corp. v. City of New York, 170 Misc. 243, 10 N.Y.S.2d
170 (Sup. Ct 1939), aff'd without opinion, 259 App. Div. 870, 20 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1940),
aff'd, 286 .N.Y. 84, 35 N.E.2d 907 (1941) (relationship among bus route, passengers, and
revenue to bus company); libel, e.g., Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 329
P.2d 867 (1958) (estimation of subject in eyes of the community) ; and safety of work-
ing place, e.g., Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 193 Ore. 556, 239 P.2d 839
(1952) (percentage of employees requesting safety device).2
7 The need for some such method was recognized by Judge Frank, dissenting in Tri-
angle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1948). The court held
that a manufacturer of girdles who sought to do business under the name of "Miss
Seventeen" was guilty of unfair competition with the magazine Seventeen. Judge Frank,
in dissent, responded that the court, to inform itself adequately, should have a staff of
investigators like those supplied to administrative agencies. Since it had no such staff,
he had "questioned some adolescent girls and their mothers and sisters"-persons he had
chosen "at random"-and had "been told uniformly by [his] questionees that no one
could reasonably believe that any relation existed between plaintiff's magazine and de-
fendants' girdles." Id. at 976. Judge Frank continued:
I admit that my method of obtaining such data is not satisfactory. But it
does serve better than anything in this record to illuminate the pivotal fact
[of secondary meaning]. . . . [P]laintiff or the trial judge might have utilized,
but did not, "laboratory" tests, of a sort now familiar, to ascertain whether nu-
merous girls and women, seeing both plaintiff's magazine and defendants' ad-
vertisements, would believe them to be in some way associated.
rd. at 976-77 (footnote omitted). See generally Blum & Kalven, The Art of Opinion Re-
search: A Lawyer's Appraisal of an Emerging Science, 24 U. CHl. L. REv. 1 (1956);
Cantwell, Public Opinion and the Legislative Process, 40 Am. PoL. ScI. REv. 924 (1946) ;
Cohen, Robson & Bates, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Community, 8 J. LEGAL E .
137 (1955) ; Cohen, Robson & Bates, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Community:
A Reply to Professor Schwartz, 8 J. LEGAL. ED. 469 (1955) ; A. DicEY, The Relation Be-
tween Law and Public Opinion, in LEcTuREs ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1-16 (2d ed. 1930); Kennedy,
Law and the Courts, in THE POLLS AND PUBLIC OPINION 92 (N. Meier & H. Saunders,
eds. 1949) ; Schwartz, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Community: A Comment, 8
J. LEGAL ED. 319 (1955) ; Waterbury, Opinion Surveys in Civil Litigation, 17 PuB. OPIN.
Q. 71 (1953).
For judicial treatment of approaches to survey methodology, see, e.g., Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Allstate Driving School, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); American
Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. So (D. Mass. 1957),
aff'd sub nom. Hawley Products Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir.
1958); R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 128 Cal. App. 2d 172, 274 P.2d 928
(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 928 (1955). With respect to survey evidence and challenge
to the accuracy of the data underlying the tabulations, see Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co.,
337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963, 1964); H. BARKSDALE, THE USE OF SURVEY RESEARCH
[Vol. 50:-493
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social science research are the same.2" Each, however, employs empirical
analysis to determine perceptions, and each is a predictive method which
can and does influence the law. Brown and other cases demonstrate that
inferences are made beyond the statistical sample contributing the data,
and that these inferences yield legislative-type determinations, even in
the adjudicative setting. When, however, the issue has been purely
adjudicative-that is, "who did what, where, when, how, and with what
motive or intent . . . ."2 -- predictive social science evidence has been
rejected more frequently. It may be that courts view pure adjudicative
controversies as susceptible to "right" and "wrong" answers and con-
sider social science evidence unhelpful in deciding these cases because of
the uncertainty involved in applying the general conclusions adduced
from this evidence to the particular case. In contrast, where matters of
broad social policy are in issue, say, the effect of segregation on the
quality of education, clear-cut answers are rare, and social science evi-
dence is useful at least to suggest the direction the law should take. A
narrower "adjudicative" setting may involve only the parties before the
court, yet it is precisely in such a case that all relevant information is
needed in order to reach an appropriate decision. Although so-called
"judicial lawmaking" may not be required, it is submitted that the court
should not ignore social science evidence simply to avoid reversal.
RELEVANCY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TO
PERSON-ORIENTED LEGAL ISSUES
The Meaning of "Person-Oriented" Adjudication
Within the context of adjudicative disputes are two types of legal
controversies-those which are act-oriented and those which are person-
oriented. The former include the who, what, where, when, and how
FINDINGS AS LEGAL EVIDENCE 115-23 (1957) ; Zeisel, The Unique; ess of Survey Evidence,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 322 (1960).
Where both parties introduce survey research having antithetical conclusions see
Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) ;
Oneida, Ltd. v. National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Where a
party seeks to introduce summaries of voluminous data, compare United States v. Mor-
timer, 118 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1941), with Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706, 710
(4th Cir. 1954) ; see also Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219, 227-28 (8th Cir. 1955),
cert. dcnied, 350 U.S. 993 (1956); Tri-Motors Sales, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 19
Wis. 2d 99, 119 N.W.2d 327 (1963) ; cf. UNIFORI COMPOSITE REPORTS AS EVIDENCE Acr,
9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. 314 (1957); UNIFORM RULES OF EV .DENCE 70(1) (d).
28 Compare, for example, opinion sampling with stimulus-re ponse research in psy-
chology.
29 Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 945, 952 (1955).
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issues before the court; the latter involve the issues of motive, attitude,
and intent. The focus here is upon the person-oriented legal controversy
as one area of the law amenable to the reception of social science
evidence, since it is this area which traditionally has exhibited perhaps
the most subjective considerations confronted by the courts."0
These person-oriented issues must be confronted by the courts
in situations of the following types: domestic relations (child custody,
divorce, state custody over potentially delinquent juveniles), restraint of
liberty (mitigation of sentence, deportation, detention of predicted bail-
jumpers and peace-breakers, commitment of dangerous mentally ill
persons), and other cases involving evaluation of the mental state or
character of one or both parties to the lawsuit. In each of these situa-
tions, social science evidence can aid in yielding a more intelligent deci-
sion, because "though adjudication is an apt procedure for judging the
conformity of acts to required standards, it is not an apt procedure for
judging persons.""
Domestic Relations
In the area of domestic relations, Fuller points out:
30 See Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Jidicial Process, 79 HARv. L. REV.
1604, 1623-24 (1966) ; L. Fuller, The Justification of Legal Decisions (paper presented
at the World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Brussels, Belgium,
Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 1971) (The title of this paper was assigned to the whole session of the
Congress. Professor Fuller informally has indicated that had he chosen a title for the
paper that would describe the content of his own contribution, he would have selected:
Interaction Between Law and the Social Context into Which It Is Projected).
Note that even in the context of the act-oriented judgment the law cannot assure
perfect correctness of result, because of the shortage of time, nonexpert sources of and
evaluators of evidence, and procedural rules. See Hart & McNaughton, supra note 10,
at 46, 49, 51-52; cf. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of
Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961).
31 Fuller, Some Unexplored Social Dimensions of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE
LAW FROIM 1967, at 57, 64 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968). The National Science Board would
go even further: "Even where great gaps of knowledge remain . . . , the social sci-
entists' experience can offer valuable intuitive understanding and special insight." NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, at xi; see also id. at xii, xvii. Although such in-
sights may not be scientifically verifiable, they still might lead to the formulation of new
theories and methods of evaluation.
It should be noted that the National Science Board study focuses on social action
programs. Id. at 3. Nevertheless the concepts generally underlying the connection be-
tween law and social science are applicable to the present article. The Report explains
that the social sciences should be used "when they are relevant to understanding and deal-
ing with significant problems in our society." Id. at 1; see generally G. LYONS, THE UN-
EASY PARTNERSHIP: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY 265-310 (1969); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS IN THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1968); Thomas, The Relation of Research to the Social
Process, in ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (Brookings Inst. ed. 1931)
[Vol. 50:-493
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A married couple have separated and are disp-,ting which of the
two shall have custody of their only child. They take their case to
court. After hearing some inclusive arguments on both sides, the
judge would be likely to cut through the usual adjudicative forms,
talk with the child out of the presence of the parents, meet and dis-
cuss the problem with each of the parents separately, and then make
up his mind as to which of the parents was most suited to raise the
child. In the ordinary law suit this sort of judicial conduct would
constitute a gross impropriety. But in the ordinary law suit the
issue to be decided is some such question as, "Did Jones, or did he
not, steal Smith's purse ?"-not the question, "Just what sort of fel-
low is Jones anyway?" Indeed, much of the law of evidence and
procedure is designed to direct attention away frora that question . 2
Social scientists have provided quite useful information about the
fundamental issue for custody decisionnaking-how the child is likely
to fare under alternative custody arrangements. Among the factors
important to this determination are the consequences of choosing either
parent, the unfitness of a parent, the effects of removing both parents,
and the extent to which the parents' and the child's wishes are to be
taken into consideration. Yet for most of these questions, direct evidence
is lacking.3  Of course, there is evidence which is indirectly relevant,
such as the subjective reports of psychiatrists and psychiatric social
workers wherein recommendations are based in part upon particularized
assessments of the parties involved.34 In fact, the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act of 1970 plainly allows for consideration of such evi-
dence in child custody cases." But the law has yet to turn its concen-
32 Fuller, supra note 31, at 64.
3 Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort
to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 167,
170 (1969) ; see also id. at 198.
34 Id. at 170.
35 Compare UNIFORM ARRAGE AND DIVORcE Acr §§ 402, 404 (emphasis added):
[Best Interests of Child.]
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of
the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors inclt.ding:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to hi 3 custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
[Interviews.]
(b) The court may seek the advice of professional personnel whether or
not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice given
shall be in writing and made available by the court to counsel upon
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trated attention to the accurate evaluation of this mass of psychological
data."'
The problems are similar in the divorce process, where legal institu-
tions are called upon to resolve family discord, yet are often empowered
to do nothing more than sever the marriage for grounds unrelated to
the underlying marital conflict.17 It is submitted, however, that courts
should strive for a more creative approach by allowing divorce, for
example, only upon the consideration of all relevant evidence bearing
upon the actual conflict involved. Such evidence would usually be com-
prised of psychological, psychiatric, or psycho-social data.8"
Restraint of Liberty
With regard to the restraint of liberty, consider these excerpts from
the remarks of judge Caverly on sentencing, in the renowned Leopold
and Loeb kidnapping-murder trial:
The court . . . feels impelled to dwell briefly on the mass of
data produced as to the physical, mental and moral condition of the
two defendants. They have been shown in essential respects to be
abnormal; had they been normal they would not have committed the
crime. It is beyond the province of this court, and it is beyond the
capacity of humankind in its present state of development, to predi-
request. Counsel may examine as a witness any professional per-
sonnel consulted by the court.
with MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added):
Sec. 3. Best interests of the child, definition.
"Best interests of the child" means the sum total of the following factors
to be considered, evaluated and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the
competing parties and the child.
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties.
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particu-
lar child custody dispute.
386 What social science might even do in the judicial context is attempt to standardize
psychological opinions, in order to facilitate comparisons of a particular personality.
37 Perhaps at the heart of the problem is the fact that the breakup of the marriage
relationship requires the attorney to play a dual role-both legal advocate and personal
counselor-yet most are "neither trained nor adequately recompensed" for this purpose.
Bohannan & Huckleberry, Institutions of Divorce, Family, and the Law, 1 LAW & Soc'Y
Rav., June 1967, at 81, 100-01 (1967) ; see note 91 infra.
38 Other social science disciplines, such as economics, anthropology, and political
science, would not be directly relevant to person-oriented legal judgments. But in the
broader sense they would pertain to the overall context in which the individual psyche
exists.
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cate ultimate responsibility for human acts.
At the same time, the court is willing to recognize that the care-
ful analysis made of the life history of the defendants and of their
present mental, emotional and ethical condition has been of extreme
interest and is a valuable contribution to criminology. And yet the
court feels strongly that similar analyses made of other persons ac-
cused of crime will probably reveal similar or different abnormalities.
The value of such tests seems to lie in their applicability to crime and
criminals in general.
Since they concern the broad question of human responsibility
and legal punishment and are in no wise peculiar to the individual
defendants, they may be deserving of legislative but not judicial
consideration. For this reason the court is satisfied that his judg-
ment in the present case cannot be affected thereby.
Under the pleas of guilty, the duty of determining the punish-
ment devolves upon the court, and the law indicates no rule or policy
for the guidance of his discretion. In reaching his decision the court
would have welcomed the counsel and support of others. In some
states the legislature, in its wisdom, has provided for a bench of
three judges to determine the penalty in cases such as this. Never-
theless, the court is willing to meet his responsibilities. [Each de-
fendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, and to 99
years for kidnapping.] 3 9
What is unsual about this opinion is that traditionally the law has
hesitated to limit individual discretion in sentencing, since "the factors
that come into play . . . are so manifold and possibly so idiosyncratic
that it is difficult to make general rules about sentencing."4 Yet here
the judge disavowed any opportunity to use his complete discretion and,
in fact, deferred responsibility to the legislature. By rejecting the dis-
cussion of the defendants' mental states, he apparently sought counsel
not to determine the proper sentence, but instead to share responsibility
for imposing it. Because of "abnormalities" existing in other persons
(accused of crime!), he refused to consider the particular idiosyncracies
39 Rprinted in W. BIsHIN & C. SToNE, LAW, LANGUAGE, ANfD ETHI-ICS 718-19 (1972).
40 Zeisel, Methodological Problems in Studies of Sentencing, 3 LAW & Soc'y REv. 621
(1969). "Instances in which the ordinary courts of law assume the function of passingjudgment on persons are rare, though an important exception exists where the judge has
the duty of setting an appropriate sentence for a person convicted of crime." Fuller,
supra note 31, at 64. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENxTENCES; LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973); ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, PROJECT ON MINI-
MUMI STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (tentative draft 1967); Hayner,
Sentencing by an Administrative Board, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 23 (1958); Rubin,
Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challeng', 40 F.R.D. 55 (1966);
Smith, The Sentencing Council and the Problem of Disproportionate Sentences, 27 FED.
PROBATION 6 (1963).
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of the defendants he confronted.
This illustration is not suggested to be the typical case; rather, it
is presented to demonstrate the gravity of the problem. If relevant
factors can be ignored, and expressly so, in a case widely viewed by the
public, then the possibilities for serious injustice are critically inherent in
less publicized decisions. And deference to the legislature likewise is
inappropriate. The fact that knowledge is in a continual state of matura-
tion is no reason for the court to defer to and rely exclusively on the
legislature to take account of new developments. The court's duty is to
confront the case before it as of the given time, including in its delibera-
tions all relevant information then' available.
Any gain in our knowledge of the determinants of behavior would
appear to permit a more fair and rational sentence. . . . By striv-
ing for understanding in the broadest manner possible under the
circumstances, we are likely to deal with behavior in accordance with
our secure knowledge of what that behavior means and what ap-
proach to the problem will best balance the humanistic and social
interests involved.41
Relevance and the Federal Rules of Evidence
At the foundation of each of the two subsections above is the idea
that in order to attain an understanding of the person, one should study
that person's mental processes." By attempting to master our under-
standing of emotional states, personalities, and various other facets of
individual behavior,4 we can accord greater accuracy to person-oriented
41 Willis, Psychiatric Testimony, Trial Gamesmanship, and the Defense of Insanity,
5 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 32, 55 (1968). Consistent with this view is the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1961) :
(4) Mitigating Circumstances [in murder case].
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the de-
fendant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for
his conduct.
(f) The defendant acted under duress . ...
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to ap-
preciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.
42 Willis, supra note 41, at 55-56. See note 38 supra.
4 3 See Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (sanity of de-
fendant at time of robbery) ; cf. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 79 HAiRy.
L. REv. 1288 (1966). I do not discuss the special intricacies of the insanity defense.
While such area certainly is related to this entire discussion, it is not necessary at this
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legal judgments. Psychiatry clearly is applicable; bv,,t other branches of
knowledge are equally important.
What evidence is relevant has recently been elucidated by the newly
enacted Federal Rules "of Evidence, which discuss "relevant evidence"
in terms of both logical and legal relevance." Relevant evidence is de-
fined as
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the actiona more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidervce.45
Whether social science evidence meets this standard primarily depends
upon one's interpretation of the expression "more probable or less prob-
able." But commentators have persuasively argued that these words
connote a sense of approaching the actual truth in a nonobjective manner,
rather than by weighing items of evidence on a percentage scale to
determine their admissibility.4 6 This is especially so when one considers
the qualifying term "any tendency," which indicates that the concept of
relevance is analagous to a spectrum, and not a clearly distinguishable
dichotomy, between truth and falsity. Thus, in an area as acutely sub-
jective as that of person-oriented judgments, any objection to evidence
which might tend to resolve the controversy should go only to the weight
of that evidence, and not to its admissibility.4 7
But the Rules also recognize that there must be methods to assure
the fairness of the proceedings. So, stating the contrary of the common
time to penetrate these complexities. Since the scope of this article comprises broad sec-
tions of the law-or of society, depending upon one's perspective-the subject of the in-
sanity defense is included within the concept of the person-orientcd legal judgment. Note
that I am not suggesting an alternative to the defense of insanity. Rather, if this defense
is employed, I would allow for additional relevant evidence either in corroboration or in
rebuttal.
4 RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGC STRATES, reprinted in 65
F.R.D. 131-70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FED. I Ev.]. See Trautman, Logical or Legal
Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 407-10 (1952).
45 FED. R. Ev. 401.
48 Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 43, 59-60 (1969) ; Ball, supra note 30, at 813; Hart & McNaugh-
ton, supra note 10; see Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact: I, 34 COLUm. L.
REv. 1224, 1252 (1934).
47 E.g., Neely v. United States, 300 F.2d 67, 73 (9th Cir.), c,'rt. denied, 369 U.S. 864
(1962) ("objection that an item of evidence is subject to conflicting inferences goes to its
weight rather than to its admissibility") ; United States v. Schi ani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (The court's function in determining relevancy is "only to decide
whether a reasonable man might have his assessment of the probabilities of a material
proposition changed by the piece of evidence sought to be admitttd. If it may affect that
evaluation it is relevant and, subject to certain other rules, admissible.. . . Even, therefore,
if a juror decides that the probability is only 40% that the [evidence is reliable], it may
help him determine whether the material proposition is more probably true than not.").
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law approach, the Rules provide that evidence should be admitted unless
some good reason exists to exclude it.4" These reasons for exclusion
come under the caption of legal relevance, which is a practical standard
for the admissibility of evidence, balancing its probative value with a
variety of competing policy considerations. As stated in the Rules,
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence. 49
It is submitted that this standard does not present an overwhelming
obstacle to the admission of social science evidence in person-oriented
legal adjudication for two major reasons. First, the standard is not
simply one of logical relevance versus the harmful consequences that
might flow from admission of the evidence. Rather, it is that those con-
sequences must Substantially outweigh the probative value of the evi-
dence. But since person-oriented adjudications directly concern evalu-
ations of individual mentalities, evaluations which at present are neces-
sarily subjective, the necessity for all logically relevant evidence is clear.
Second, the Rules explicitly provide for safeguards which can be used
to minimize any unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
of the jury.5"
One of these precautionary devices--devices that also aid in dis-
closing the reliability of the evidence-is that of a limiting jury instruc-
tion, which could be used in cases of doubt about legal relevance."' A
second safeguard is a provision allowing for the use of expert testimony
to assist the trier of fact with scientific or other technical knowledge.52
48 The common law approach is discussed in 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8(a) (3d ed.
1940).
49 FED. R. Ev. 403. "Legal" relevance is to be distinguished from "conditional" rele-
vance, in which the probative value of the evidence depends upon the existence of another
fact. Id. 104(b).
50 The remaining auxiliary policy considerations mentioned in Rule 403-undue de-
lay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence do not seem to be as
significant as prejudice, confusion, or misleading factors. For example, the second con-
junction--"or"-in Rule 403 denotes the separateness of these groups of factors. One
should observe, however, that even in jury cases, certain person-oriented issues, e.g., child
custody and sentencing, are solely in the court's domain. Thus, in such cases legal rele-
vancy poses a negligible problem.5 1 See FED. R. Ev. 106.
52 R. Ev. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
[Vol. 50.493
SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
In conjunction with this, and to defend against both financial burden
and shopping for experts, the Rules provide for the appointment sua
sponte or on the motion of any party of a court-appointed expert wit-
ness." Such a witness must advise all parties of his findings; any party
may take his deposition; any party or the judge may call him to testify;
and he is subject to cross-examination by all parties, including the party
calling him as a witness. 4 Thus when social science testimony is pre-
sented to the court by a private expert witness, mony of the customary
problems associated with its admission can be overcome.
The same is true if the evidence is presented by some way other
than expert testimony. The parties, for example, might stipulate as to
its admission. In such a case, any objection on the ground of prejudice
would be waived, and problems of confusion of the issues or misleading
of the jury still could be controlled by limiting instructions, or by a
court-appointed expert, or both. Or the evidence conceivably might be
subject to judical notice. In this case, the situation also is controllable.
While the Rules deal with judicial notice only of adjudicative facts"
which contain a high degree of indisputability, 6 evidence regarding the
propriety of taking judicial notice presumably could still be taken from
- FED. R. Ev. 706. "The ever-present possibility that the juege may appoint an expert
in a given case must inevitably exert a sobering effect on the expe!rt witness of a party and
upon the person utilizing his services." PROPOsED RULES OF Evil 'ENCE FOR UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES § 706, Advisory Committee's Note (Supreme Court Draft,
Nov. 1972) (emphasis in original).
54 FED. R. Ev. 706(a).
55 FED. R. Ev. 201 (a) ; see note 10 supra. On the effects of judicial notice of legisla-
tive facts, see Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEo. L.J. 125, 161-63 (1973); see also Note, Judicial Notice in tile Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 453, 455-56.
rG FED. R. Ev. 201(b). An interesting comment recently ha., been made in a case re-
jecting the admission of polygraph evidence, which the judge considered to be social-
scientific in nature:
The Court may take judicial notice that the physical sciences exceed the social
sciences, including clinical psychology, in terms of experimer tal quantification and
verifiability. Indeed, the uniqueness of the human psyche still provokes debate
as to whether the study of human behavior can approach scientific standards as
understood in the physical disciplines.
United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (D. Md. 1973). This raises the issue
of the reliability of the types of evidence which I propose shotId be admissible in cases
dealing with person-oriented legal judgments. This subject is only indirectly discussed
in this article, because there are varying degrees of reliability . ith different types of so-
cial scientific methods. The point, however, is that reliability is U component of relevance,
and, therefore, should only be considered in determining the weight of the evidence.
See generally Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("Just when a
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the (xperimental and demon-
strable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized . ").
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expert witnesses." A difference from the provisions for expert testimony
in other situations, however, is that this evidence would not be presented
to the jury." Hence problems concerning the jury would be avoided,
with the court instructing the jury in a civil case that they must, and in a
criminal case that they may, "accept as conclusive any fact judicially
noticed." 9
Thus, when in the context of person-oriented adjudication, doubt
arises as to whether the search for truth will be helped or hindered by
the interjection of particular social science evidence, one might bear in
mind the words of an eminent nineteenth century Georgia jurist:
Truth, common sense, and enlightened reason, alike demand the aboli-
tion of all those artificial rules which shut out any fact . . . , how-
ever remotely relevant, or from whatever source derived, which
would assist [in determining the issues] PO
THE PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATION: A
UNIVERSAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE
While it is important to collect and analyze all relevant data, we
must realize that courts as well as other decisionmaking bodies must act
on incomplete or inconclusive data. Therefore, assumptions cannot be
avoided. But if the process is a conscious one, it may be possible to
identify particular assumptions and to estimate their reliability."' To this
end, social science evidence may be relevant to all types of adjudication.
This neoteric attitude reached the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1958.2 In Hawkins v. United States," involving a prosecu-
tion under the Mann Act, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction in
which the trial judge refused to apply the common law rule excluding
one spouse's testimony against the other. Justice Black, for the majority,
proclaimed that the effect of discarding the rule would be "to destroy
almost any marriage," basing his conclusion on "reason and experi-
57 FED. R. Ev. 201 (e) :
A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to
the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the
absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has
been taken.
58 FED. R. Ev. 201 (g).
59 Id. 201(e).
60 Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55, 62 (1853) (Lumpkin, I.).61 See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 76
(1966).
62 See Rosenberg, Methods of Reasoning and Justification in Social Science and Law,
Comments, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 199, 201 (1970); Rosenberg, The New Looks in Law, 52
MARQ. L. REV. 539 (1969).
63 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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ence."' Animadverted Justice Stewart: "Surely 'reason and experi-
ence' require that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions, per-
haps naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient rule to the
interests of domestic tranquillity."65 He called for a study of the actual
impact on marital harmony in the many states which had adopted the
contrary rule,"' in order to verify the postulate upon which the majority
operated. In effect, Justice Stewart argued that if by empirical inquiry
social science could unearth legal and other assumptions, then adjudica-
tion would become a more consciously objective function.67 The signifi-
cance of this proposition is that since perception of "reality"-which is
based upon momentary "truths"" 8 -is directly related to the quality of
information upon which ultimate "facts" are formulated, 9 then the
assumptions which found such perceptions must continually be verified.70
04Id. at 78, 79; see 8 J. 'WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-45 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
65 358 U.S. at 81-82.
60 Id. at 82 n.4; compare Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 736 n.19 (1972) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting) ("We must often proceed in a state of less than perfect knowl-
edge . . . ."). Such studies also would be helpful with regard to other rules in the
domestic relations rubric. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) (statute
proscribing abortion held unconstitutional: "despite the presence of rascals in the medical
profession, as in all others, we trust that most physicians are 'god' . . . .") ; Klein v.
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962) (interspousal immunity for negligent torts) ;
Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962) (interspousal immunity for intentional
torts); Commonwealth v. Jones, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 269, 275 (Lehigh County Ct. 1954)
(rebuttable presumption that a wife's drinking is invited by the husband is "based upon
human experience.").
67 This argument was not a novel one to legal philosophical hought. Cardozo wrote
of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and content of
their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie
so near the surface, however, that their existence and influence are not likely to
be disclaimed. But . . .. [d]eep below consciousness are other forces, the
likes and dislikes, the predilections and prejudices, the complex of instincts and
emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, wliether he be litigant
or judge.
B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921) (emphasis added);
see H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 4, 7 (3d ed. 1888) ; see also Har L & McNaughton, supra
note 10, at 63; Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 233 (1931).
s
38 See R. XVEsr, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1950). "Cur whole thought fabric
is relative not in the old sense that reality is dependent upon L eing known, but in the
sense that it only includes such facets of reality as our faculties can grasp. These facets
may be quite correctly appreciated and yet our use of them in the interpretation of reality
might be defective for lack of other facts." L. HoBHousE, supra note 6, at 308 n.1;
see note 89 infra.
69 See D. HumE, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDEMTANDING §§ IV, V, XII
(Hendel ed. 1955) ; see generally A. CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY
169-257 (2d ed. 1963); L. HODHOUSE, supra note 6, at 301; J. HosPERs, AN INTRODUCTION
TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 159-220, 379-448 (1953); N. KJ.AUSNER & P. KUNTZ,
PHILOSOPHY: THE STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE BELIEFS ch. 5 (1961); P. WHEELWRIGHT,
THE WAY OF PHILOSOPHY 24-42 (rev. ed. 1960).
70 This raises the question of whether it is possible to make such continual verifica-
tion. One might argue that if an assumption can be verified, then it no longer is an
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Fundamentally, we are confronted with the nature of science and of
the law, both of which originated in primitive religion and developed
academic perspectives in recent centuries.7' Each is similar to and
different from the other. "The common elements in both have been an
effort to be wholly rational, to organize and institutionalize the search
for truthful data, and, above all, to seek truthful data as the basis for
judgments. ' 7 Both also seek to secure "agreement among different
individuals with respect to certain kinds of questions and problems.7,
As for the dissimilarities, one is the method of inquiry. The legal method
relies primarily upon testimony refined in an adversarial setting. In
assumption. Thus such a process would pave the way to an infinite regression of as-
sumptions. My response is that assumptions once "verified" are assumptions nonetheless,
albeit presently more accurate ones, since the procedures for verification are based upon
current knowledge and information. Consequently, the process of continual verification
would open the path to an infinite progression of assumptions, with the assumptions be-
coming more objective-that is, subject to being accepted by the most modem methods-
as the states of art and science develop over time.
71 Loevinger, Law and Science as Rival Systems, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 530, 535 (1967);
see H. MAINE, supra note 67; see also Rosenberg, The New Looks in Law, 52 MAiRQ. L.
REv. 539, 540 (1969). I do not mean to say that science is indistinguishable from social
science. It is not; but at the root, each employs a similar approach to discovering informa-
tion--empirical analysis.
7 2 Loevinger, supra note 71, at 533; see also Loevinger, Science and Legal Thinking,
25 FED. B.J. 153 (1965).
Patterson has written that "[t]he scientific analogy is, for legal philosophy, an in-
tellectual bridge from a science to the legal order." E. PArasoN, supra note 8, at 24.
See also S. AMos, THE SCIENCE or LAW (9th ed. 1909); H. CAIRNs, THE THEORY OF
LEGAL SCIENCE (1941); B. CARnozo, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND An-
DRESSES 40 (1931) and B. CARDOzo, supra note 8; R. CLARKE, THE SCIENCE OF LAW AND
LAWMAKING (1898); J. CONANT, ON UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 22 (1951); A. EINSTEIN,
THE WORLD As I SEE IT 135-37 (1949); K. GARtIs, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE or
LAW (3d rev. ed. A. Kocourek transl. 1911); H. KELsEN, PunR THEORY OF LAW, ch. 3
(2d rev. ed. M. Knight transl. 1967) ; A. Kocoux, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE
OF LAW 202 (1930) ; E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 485-98 (1961) ; 0. Holmes,
Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443 (1899), reprinted in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 210 (1920); Pound, Juristic Science and Law, 31 HARv. L. REv. 1047
(1918); Pound, Law and the Science of Law in Recent Theories, 43 YALE L.. 525
(1934).
One should not overlook that the la* repeatedly has been perceived as a social sci-
ence. For example, although the Social Science Research Council, formally organized in
1923, included no member from the legal profession, whereas fellows from the areas of
anthropology, economics, history, political science, psychology, sociology, and statistics
were included, THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCl., DECENNIAL REPORT, 1921-1933,
at iii (1934), it soon was made clear that the law was a social science "in aim if not in
achievement." Rose, supra note 6, at 206. Commented Pound in 1933:
[W]e seek a certain unification of the social sciences. jurisprudence is no longer
held self-sufficient. Economics, sociology, ethics, psychology, as well as politics
and philosophy, are to be drawn upon; law is to be studied as part of the whole
process of social control.
Pound, The Ideal and the Actual in Law--Forty Years After, 1 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 431,
436 (1933) ; see Hazard, supra note 7, at 408; Maechling, Legal Research and the Prob-
lems of Society, 21 3. LEGAL ED. 86, 89 (1968) ; cf. Stone, supra note 8.7 Loevinger, supra note 71, at 534.
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science the method primarily is experimental, statistical, value-free, and
clinical.7" Another difference is that "[w]hile science seeks to anaylze
and predict phenomena, law seeks to classify and control conduct ...
[T] he function of science is descriptive and that of law is prescrip-
t iv e . '71
This is not to say that no problems in the law are subject to
empirical study and analysis. On the contrary, person-oriented legal
judgments constitute one example amenable to such investigation. As
Loevinger appropriately has asserted, "The fundamental point that
lawyers, as well as scientists, must understand is that both the dialectic
method of law and the empiric method of science are merely means of
gathering and helping to organize data . . . ."I" And the information
from each of these two data sources is complementary rather than
mutually exclusive, allowing for diverse types of information to be
applied to particular inquiries. But the law has withtood recognition of
this significant premise.
The case of Maxwell v. Bishop77 exemplifies this judicial reluctance.
Maxwell, a black man, was convicted of raping a white woman in Hot
Springs, Arkansas. Appealing for the second time to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upon denial of his habeas
corpus petition, he alleged, inter alia, that the Arkansas law 8 was uncon-
stitutionally applied and enforced against him in violation of the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The
basis of Maxwell's argument was that in Arkansas, pursuant to long-
standing custom and practice, blacks convicted of this crime against
white women usually were sentenced to death, while white men con-
victed of rape, and black men convicted of raping black women, typically
were not sentenced to death.7 ' The application for the writ of habeas
corpus alleged that since the previous disposition by the same court,
new evidence had become available on this issue-a systematic study of
Arkansas rape convictions during a 20-year period, which had been con-
ducted in the summer of 1965 as part of a study of the application of
the death penalty for rape in 11 Southern States. The study required the
work of 28 law students throughout the summer, the expenditure of
74Id.
5 Id. at 535.
7 1d. at 541.
77398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on oiher grounds, 398 U.S.
262 (1970).78 Arkansas Statute 41-3403 provided for the death penalty at that time. For a his-
tory of the statute, see 398 F.2d at 139 n.1.
79 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
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more than $35,000, and numerous hours of consultative time by expert
criminal lawyers, criminologists, and statisticians."
In reviewing the petition, judge (now Justice) Blackmun recognized
the possible values of social science data in litigation but was reluctant to
bridge the gap from traditional rejection to modern acceptance of social
science methods useful in legal adjudication:
We are not yet ready to condemn and upset the result reached
in every case of a negro rape defendant in the State of Arkansas on
the basis of broad theories of social and statistical injustice.
We therefore reject the statistical argument in its attempted ap-
plication to Maxwell's case. Whatever value that argument may
have as an instrument of social concern, whatever suspicion it may
arouse with respect to southern interracial rape trials as a group
over a long period of time, and whatever it may disclose with re-
spect to other localities, we feel that the statistical argument does
nothing to destroy the integrity of Maxwell's trial. Although the
investigation and study made by Professor Wolfgang in the summer
of 1965 is interesting and provocative, we do not, on the basis of that
study, upset Maxwell's conviction and, as a necessary consequence,
cast serious doubt on every other rape conviction in the state courts
of Arkansas.81
There were indications that had the Wolfgang study included the county
of the Maxwell trial in its sample the Court would have had a more diffi-
cult time affirming the conviction.82 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the
Court missed the evidentiary boat, especially in light of Maxwell's
argument:
On three previous occasions . . . courts have held that [the
petitioner did not make a sufficient showing of racially discrimina-
tory capital sentencing under Arkansas' rape statutes] notwithstand-
ing that on each successive occasion the evidence tended in the direc-
tion of more depth and completeness. If nothing else, petitioner's
failure thus far to convince the courts of his proof, demonstrates
how difficult it is for Negro litigants generally and those without
80 Petition for Habeas Corpus 1 7(b); see Brief for Petitioner at 7, 10-19, 21-23
n.10, Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968). Deposition by Written Inter-
rogatory of Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang (taken September 15, 1967) and Exhibit 4, Abrams
v. Smith, No. 5151 (Liberty County, Super. Ct., Ga.), on file with N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y. General sum-
maries of the study can be found at 398 F.2d at 141-48; see also Note, A Study of the
California Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297 (1969).
"' 398 F.2d at 147-48.
82 d. at 147 ("what we are concerned with here is Maxwell's case and only Max-
well's case . . ").
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means particularly, to make the courts see "the re;lity of the world,
indeed . . . the segregated world," Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 12
(5th Cir. 1966), in which they live. . . Petitioner, with this sub-
mission has made every effort that he could, has mustered all the
resources available to him to make "the law . . . see what all others
see."
8
The examination of "what all others see" is a problem of perspec-
tive, requiring, in this exploration for knowledge and understanding,
that interdisciplinary investigation become the keystone.84 To the extent
that it can aid in the understanding of legal issue, a social-legal or
psycho-legal jurisprudence should be of interest to every practicing
lawyer.
At its base, this interest is essential to the integrity of our legal
system.
[S] ince law in the end always deals with human be ngs, there would
seem to be almost no area in which the influence and findings of the
social and behavioral sciences might not be used to explain and im-
prove the law in its daily operation upon the members of our
society.81
To the response that this multidisciplinary approach is too recent to
demand more than cautiously gradual acceptance, notice that it has had
early juridical support. For example, in his Path of the Law in 1897,
Holmes wrote:
83 Brief for Petitioner at 44-45, Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968);
see Fahr & Ojemann, The Use of Social and Behavioral Science Knowledge in Law, 48
IowA L. REv. 59, 60 (1962) (emphasis in original) :
This reluctance by lawyers to adopt social and behavioral science evidence
can be explained on several grounds, not all of them complmentary to lawyers
or to the scientists concerned. But leaving aside those who will not see, there
remain many who recognize the potentialities of these dkciplines but remain
dubious as to applying them to legal matters.
See also note 88 infra.
The analogy to sight and seeing in Maxwell's petition probably originates in Burns,
To a Louse, in PoErIcAL VWoRKS OF BURNs 43, 44 (Cambridge ed. 1974):
0 wad some Power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as ithers see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us,
An' foolish notion:
What airs in dress an' gait wad lea'e us,
An' ev'n devotion!
34 One commentator views interdisciplinary investigation as "a matter of deep logical
necessity." Scriven, Methods of Reasoning and Justification in social Science and Law,
23 J. LEGAL ED. 189 (1970).
8 5 Fahr & Ojemann, supra note 83, at 59. This is not to rule out other areas of in-
quiry. Interdisciplinariness refers not only to law and social science, but to any mixture
of the social sciences, or to any study of the "general aspects" of the law. See note 6
supra.
1975]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
It is through [the more general aspects of the law] that you not only
become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with
the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its un-
fathomable process, a hint of the universal law.86
The law is not an "isolated island in vacuo" ;s7 it is a mere scintilla
of all that exists, a single branch of the vast tree of knowledge in the
wider forest of truth, with its own special perspective and awareness.88
While no area of knowledge deals with its objects of inquiry in their full
substance, certain properties are selected in an effort to establish rela-
tionships among them. The finding of such principles is the ultimate
goal of all rational inquiry,89 the endeavor to bring all relevant perspec-
tives to bear upon the issue sought to be resolved. If the law is per-
ceived as one aspect of society which relates to all mankind, then the
law can constitute a quintessential orientation for interdisciplinary col-
laboration, from which one can "enlarge the field of vision within the
limits of which decisions must be made."9 Writes Rosenberg:
[T]here are signs of new perspectives for law-perspectives that
come from facing forward and looking outward, in contrast to the
traditional legal position that was to face backward and peer inward.
This change will have practical impact: it will increase law's ca-
pacity to serve society. It will also have intellectual impact: it will
affect the way law is taught, studied, and thought about.9
86 Holmes, supra note 7, at 478.
87 Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 HARP. L. R~v. 622 (1916).
88 See Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HAv. L. REv. 617, 621 (1916) ("[The law]
must assimilate society before society will assimilate it; it must become organic to remain
a living organ."). See also H. CAIRNS, supra note 10, at xiv, 266; E. PATTERSON, JURIS-
PRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW, §§ 4.63-.64, esp. 546-48 (1953); R. POUND,
OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 238 (5th ed. 1943) ; H. TAFT, LEGAL MiScEL-
LANIES: SIX DECADES OF CHANGES AND PRoGREss 100-11 (1941); Fuller, supra note 31,
at 59, 69; Parsons, Law and Sociology: A Promising Courtship?, in THE PATH OF THE
LAW FRoM 1967, at 47, 54 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968) ; Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LAsx, RADBRUCH, AND DADIN 140 (W. Wilk transl. 1950).
89 Lazarsfeld, Evidence and Inference in Social Research, 87 DAEDALUS, Fall 1958, at
99, 100 (1958) ; see also Holmes, supra note 7, at 458; cf. Ball, supra note 30, at 830.
Even if only an individual truth exists, it has not yet been discovered. Therefore, in his
ignorance, man still may have varying interpretations of the world, based on the variety
of then-existing "truths." See generally G. BARNETT & J. OTIS, CORPORATE SOCIETY AND
EDUCATION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ELIJAH JORDAN (1961); E. JORDAN, FORMS OF INDI-
VIDUALITY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE GROUNDS OF ORDER IN HUMAN RELATIONS (1927);
E. JORDAN, THE GOOD LIFE (1949); M. OTTO, THE HUMAN ENTERPRISE (1940); J. RAN-
DALL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND (rev. ed. 1940); Dewey, The Meanings of
Philosophy, in INTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD: JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY (J.
Ratner ed. 1939); Russell, The Valve of Philosophy, in PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (M.
Fisher, G. Murray, J. Thompson & W. Brewster eds. 1919).
90 K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 169 (1936) ; see Ohlin, Partnership with the
Social Sciences, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 204, 207 (1970).
91 Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 539; cf. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence:
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Perhaps in the future we will be able to determine an individual's
motives, attitudes, and intent from his actions, appearance, and gestures
alone. But then, as now, the courts should undertake the responsibility
of accepting relevant evidence from fragments of the universe other
than those of which the legal tradition has heretofore approved. With
these perspectives brought to bear upon the inevitable legal judgment,
the law-more intelligently conceived and executed 2-can help to
clear a more direct route toward truth and understanding, as well as
toward the doing of justice.93
CONCLUSION
It is the task of courts to decide. Understandably, there must be
protections regarding the evidence which is used to support such deci-
sions. But at least as important is the recognition that all evidence
relevant to the issues in the proceedings must be admitted. To the extent
that there are adequate safeguards, there is no problem with the ad-
mission of relevant evidence. To the extent that safeguards might be
less than adequate, the scale still should tip in favor of admission of the
evidence, with any objection going only to its weight, keeping in mind
that the purpose of our judicial proceedings is to determine the truth
in the controversy before the court. This analysis applies to all adjudica-
tion, but holds especially true in cases involving person-oriented ad-
judication-that is, adjudication concerning individual motives, atti-
tudes, and intent-wherein ultimate determinations necessarily are highly
subjective.
One source of information pertinent to such judgments is social
A Connon Language for Babylon, 65 COLuzi. L. REv. 1331, 1343-46 (1965). Of course,
it will be necessary for lawyers to surmount their own confusioa as to the methodology,
uses, and consequences of such evidence. One reason, no doubt, for the substantial non-
acceptance of social science evidence by the legal fraternity is tlat lawyers, for the most
part, are neither trained nor capable of handling it. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mul-
ford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.), modified on other grounds, 196 F. 496(2d Cir. 1912); Auerbach, Legal Tasks for the Sociologist, 1 LAW & Soc'Y Rxv., Nov.
1966, at 91, 97; Loevinger, supra note 71, at 539, 541, 550-31; Hart & McNaugh-
ton, supra note 10, at 57; Symposium on Social Research and the Law, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 1
(1970) ; see also Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagueship,
9 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1957); Watson, Foote, Levin & Kalven, Lcw School Developments,
11 J. LEGAL ED. 73-99 (1958); cf. Kayton, Can Jurinetrics B.? of Value to Jurispru-
dence?, 33 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 287 (1964); Loevinger, Jurimctrics: Science and Pre-
diction in the Field of Law, 46 MINN. L. REv. 255 (1961) ; A Sy,nposium: Social Science
Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79 Hxv. L. REv. 1551 (1966) ; Tapp, Psychology and
the Law: The Dilemma, PsYcHoLoGY TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 16.
92 Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VUL.
L. Rxv. 225, 234 (1960).
9 See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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science, which investigates, among other things, issues underlying the
disputes which comprise person-oriented adjudication. Therefore, rele-
vant social science information should not be rejected out of hand.
"Facts" are only relative; "assumptions" which underlie these facts
change over time. Thus, to the extent that these assumptions can
reliably be verified with the theories and methods available to current
knowledge, a court is obliged to accept such verification. To do any
less is to ignore the precepts of our jurisprudence.
